INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s there has been growing international acceptance that 'hardcore' cartel activity 1 poses a serious threat to economies and consumers and constitutes 'the supreme evil of antitrust' 2 and 'the most egregious' 3 violation of competition law. Most antitrust systems now clearly prohibit cartel activity, treating it as an 'automatic' violation of the rules. 4 As consensus over the economic harm 5 caused by cartels and the need for clear rules prohibiting them has strengthened, debate has focused on the question of how best to reflect the seriousness of the offence, how to combat cartel activity and how to ensure that it is detected, deterred and punished. 6 In section 2 of this article it is seen that international initiatives and greater multilateral and bilateral cooperation between competition authorities have significantly contributed to the dramatic shift in perceptions of, and attitudes towards, cartels and to a 'global trend toward enhanced sanctions combined with common enforcement techniques'. 7 Although this international convergence is occurring through a variety of legal techniques, which reflect the different histories and the diverse political, cultural and economic factors which have shaped the development of competition law and policy in each jurisdiction, ' [a] truly global effort against hard core cartels has emerged'. 8 Around the world sanctions for those involved in cartel conduct have been mounting, leniency regimes are commonly being utilised as an important anti-cartel enforcement tool serving to destabilise cartels and encouraging a 1 Broadly anti-competitive arrangements between competitors to fix prices, make rigged bids (collusive tenders), establish output restrictions or quotas, or share or divide markets, OECD Publication, 'Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective action Against Hard Core Cartels' C(98)35/FINAL, of May 1998. In the US, for example, cartel arrangements are, because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue, considered to be illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act of 1890, Northern Pac R Co v United States, 356 US 1, 5 (1958) . Similarly, in the EU, cartels are presumed to violate Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the 'TFEU') -they automatically infringe Article 101(1) -restrict competition by object -and, being naked, are incapable of satisfying the conditions for the legal exception set out in Article 101(3). 5 See further nn 11-14 and surrounding text. 6 Although enforcement by private individuals in civil proceedings may also deter violations this article focuses on public enforcement. 'race to confess', and criminal cartel regimes are burgeoning. 9 Despite the rapidly increasing number of criminal cartel regimes, however, few jurisdictions, aside from the US, have been successful in imprisoning individuals involved in cartel conduct. This article considers why this might be, focussing on the difficulties and problems that have been encountered in the UK where a criminal cartel offence was enacted in 2002 (and amended and reformed in 2013).
Sections 3 and 4 discuss theoretical and practical obstacles which appear, up until now, to have undermined the force and effectiveness of the UK criminal cartel regime and led to concerns about its scope. Section 3 sets out the view that, although it is arguably tempting, as the UK Government has done, to use the criminal law as a form of preference-shaping disincentive to deter violations of anti-cartel rules, this approach does not consider whether there are any inherent differences between criminal and civil law which might prevent them appearing simply as different points on a continuous spectrum. Nor, therefore, does it consider whether there may be disadvantages associated with such a 'spectrum' approach. Section 3 thus examines what criminal law is, how it differs from civil law and concludes that there is something special about the criminal law, namely that it signals moral condemnation of the criminalised conduct. Further, it is argued in this section that as it has not been made clear how the original, or reformed, criminal cartel offence reflects or builds moral stigma 10 of prohibited conduct, there is a risk not only that it will continue to be ineffective but that its existence might damage the condemnatory force of the criminal law more generally. Section 4 goes on to examine substantive and procedural problems which have created practical difficulties in drafting, implementing and properly confining the scope of the criminal cartel offence and which seem likely to have contributed to its under-enforcement.
Given the risks and concerns identified, Section 5 concludes that caution should be exercised before a state, intent on increasing deterrents to cartel activity, decides to criminalise such conduct. Consequently, it recommends that such jurisdictions should consider not only criminalisation of cartel activity but whether steps to enhance civil enforcement might be a preferable and more efficient solution for increasing the force of, and respect for, cartel rules.
CRIMINALISATION OF CARTELS: A GROWING TREND?
Of all agreements, cartels most contradict the principles of the free market economy: the operators specifically conspire to eliminate the free play of competition between themselves. In addition they are costly to create and enforce, 11 harm efficiency 12 and are 'naked' -'[t]hey seek to restrict competition without producing any objective 9 The term 'criminal' is used here in the traditional sense and distinctly to the broader use of that term used in the context of the European Convention of Human Rights, see especially n 24 and text. 10 The different meanings of stigma are discussed further below, section 3.B. countervailing benefits'. 13 Indeed, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development ('OECD') has estimated that cartels cost society billions and thwart the gains sought to be achieved through global market liberalization.
14 In consequence, it has led an international effort to halt cartel conduct urging member countries to ensure that their competition laws effectually deter cartel conduct by, in particular, providing for effective sanctions. 15 Further, competition authorities now work together, particularly through the International Competition Network (the ICN), 16 but also though other formal and informal bilateral and multilateral arrangements, to combat cartels and to coordinate searches and investigations across jurisdictions.
In the EU, a network of competition authorities, the European Competition Network (ECN), comprised of the European Commission (the Commission) and the national competition authorities of the Member States (NCAs) are responsible for public enforcement of the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements set out in Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). When enforcing Article 101, the Commission acts as an integrated decision-maker, deciding which cases to investigate, whether to initiate proceedings, whether an infringement has occurred and what sanctions should be imposed on undertakings in breach, in an administrative procedure. Regulation 1/2003, reflecting the more traditionally outcome-oriented, regulatory and empirical approach to competition and cartel regulation in the EU, 17 specifically provides that decisions adopted by the Commission using this procedure 'shall not be of a criminal law nature'. 18 Nonetheless, in line with the international trend, the Commission now considers fighting cartels to be one of its core priorities and over the last couple of decades has radically changed its policy and approach to ensure effective action against them. It uses strong language against cartels (Mario The existence of such harm, however, does not on its own lead inevitably to the conclusion that criminal law must be used in order to deter the activity. As will be discussed in further detail below, the key to the use of criminal law is its unique ability automatically to signal society's moral condemnation of the activity, and this is in turn dependent on a combination of both harm and an assessment of the moral culpability of the defendants in producing that harm. Indeed for some theorists, this culpability is of greater significance than the harm produced. See, e.g. A Ashworth, 'Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm under the Code, and in the Common Law ' (1987-1988) 20 found to have participated in the breach 21 which are not out of line with those imposed on corporations in the US following criminal proceedings. The Commission has also increased international cooperation focused on the elimination of hardcore cartel activity, adopted and honed a leniency programme 22 and introduced a procedure for the settlement of cartel cases. 23 An integrated agency model, where a single agency undertakes investigative, enforcement, and adjudicative functions, is also utilised in a number of EU Member States (including in the UK), as a mechanism for enforcing EU and national competition laws. A number of concerns have been arising about this model of enforcement, especially at the EU level. First, there is unease about the radical changes in the nature of the Commission's approach. This, combined with the recognition that antitrust fines (designed to have deterrent effect) are to be treated as de facto 'criminal' charges 24 within the meaning of Article 6(1) European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights ('ECHR'), has led to increasingly vociferous claims that the EU enforcement structure is not sufficient to comply with Article 6 ECHR and, in particular, to ensure the investigated undertakings' right to a fair trial. 25 Case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) indicates, however, that the integrated agency model for competition enforcement is compatible with Article 6 so long as certain conditions are satisfied. 26 In particular, the administrative body's preliminary decision-taking procedures must be governed by sufficiently strong procedural guarantees and its decisions must be subject to sufficient judicial control by a body with ' jurisdiction' on questions of fact and of law and with power to quash challenged decision in all respects. 27 Second, and conversely perhaps, the view is increasingly being articulated that these penalties are not sufficient to deter cartel behaviour which is easily hidden and reaps significant profits. Corporate 28 fines do not target individuals responsible, may have spill-over effects (penalising innocent shareholders, employees and creditors) and would need to be impossibly high to ensure deterrence.
29
'To deter cartel activity, the sanctions imposed on cartel participants must produce sufficient disutility to outweigh what the participants expect to gain from the cartel activity. Moreover, the disutility of the sanctions must outweigh the expected gain by enough to account for the fact that the sanctions may not be imposed at all and would be imposed, if at all, after the gains had been realised.' 30 Indeed, some studies reinforce the view that corporate fines are not the highest concern to companies 31 and may not be deterring recidivism in the EU.
32
Consequently, it is more frequently being advocated that control which recognises the role that individuals play in instigating, or not preventing, competition law infringements is required. 33 In the US, for example, violation of the Sherman Act is a felony and, for some time, both Republican and Democratic administrations have 27 See ibid and eg, W Wils, 'The compatibility with fundamental rights of the EU antitrust enforcement system in which the European Commission acts both as investigator and as firstinstance decision maker' (2014) 37(1) World Competition ***. 
43
The offence is extraditable.
criminal cartel offence was created entirely separately from the administrative one 44 and made applicable only to individuals not to 'undertakings'. Further, a dishonesty 45 requirement was incorporated into the original offence which was intended, in particular: to ensure that the regime would not be applicable to individuals engaged in activities which would be lawful under the civil regime (for example, because they produce countervailing benefits and so are compatible with Article 101/CA98 on account of their pro-competitive effects); 46 to signal the seriousness of the offence; to make it more likely that courts would impose custodial sentences; and to reduce the risk that the offence would be categorised as 'national competition law' for the purposes of Regulation 1/2003. 47 'Whilst it was recognised at the time that the inclusion of a dishonesty requirement was an imperfect means of achieving these objectives, it was seen as the best available option'. 48 It is well known that, in spite of this marked increase in preference for criminalisation across the world, successful deployment of criminal enforcement models has not proved easy outside of the US. In some jurisdictions (such as Ireland), for example, authorities have successfully prosecuted individuals, but have been unable to persuade courts to imprison offenders. 49 In the UK, the deterrent effect of the cartel offence has been weaker than intended 'because there have been so few completed cases to date'. 50 Rather than the six-ten prosecutions per year predicted, 51 only three individuals, in relation to a single cartel -the Marine Hoses cartel, 52 were convicted and sentenced to prison during its first ten years. The only other criminal prosecution brought, of British Airways employees, spectacularly collapsed when it emerged that certain evidence had not been properly disclosed by the OFT, causing significant 44 As recommended by OFT365, n 40 and below section 3. embarrassment to the OFT. 53 In its 2010 consultation on reform of the UK competition law regime, the Government concluded that the most important contributing factor responsible for the dearth of criminal cases and the weakening of the offence's deterrent effect had been the incorporation of the dishonesty requirement into the offence. 54 Following consultation, 55 it went on to remove the dishonesty requirement from the offence and to add statutory exclusions and defences instead.
56
These changes, introduced by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (ERRA13), will come into force in April 2014 along with other significant changes to the UK competition law regime, including the creation of a single Competition Markets Authority (the CMA).
This article takes the view that although incorporation of a dishonesty requirement is likely to have been a factor in the criminal regime's lack of success, it is by no means clear that it was the decisive factor. Rather, it considers that the most fundamental problem has been that the Government has not engaged sufficiently with the question of why criminalisation is necessary and appropriate at all for individual cartel behaviour. Further, that the Government has underestimated the substantive and practical problems arising from criminalisation 57 and, in particular, from the operation of parallel civil and criminal cartel regimes. As these wider matters have not been addressed by the 2013 reforms, there is a concern that they may persist.
THE UK PERSPECTIVE: IS CRIMINALISATION LEGITIMATE?

A. THE EXPANDING USE OF CRIMINAL LAW IN THE REGULATORY CONTEXT
The drive for criminalisation in the UK resulted not from a public sense of 'moral outrage' and a bottom-up (or backward-looking) process, but from a top-down (forward-looking) one, driven by the international initiatives described above and the Government and OFT who were eager to introduce greater deterrents to cartel activity. This approach reflects the UK Government's willingness more generally to utilise a variety of alternative offences and enforcement tools -civil/ administrative and criminal -as mechanisms for promoting and encouraging compliance with a regulatory objective. 58 Notwithstanding the lack of live evidence of difficulties arising during the course of a jury trial in a contested case, the government has concluded that is more likely than not that the inclusion of the 'dishonesty' element in the cartel offence is in fact inhibiting the OFT in prosecuting cases. 'Dishonesty' seems to be particularly difficult to prosecute in a white collar criminal environment. BIS 'Growth, competition and the competition regime: Government response to consultation'(May 2012), 7.8.
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Consultation Document, n 50. 70 the difficulty with all of these 'distinctions' is that counter-examples can generally be given. Thus as far as the public nature of criminal harm is concerned 71 private prosecutions, although rare, can be brought in English criminal law, while conversely, public intervention can equally be civil rather than criminal. Further, criminal law does not always require mens rea, since it contains offences of strict liability 72 and there is not a perfect match between criminal law and the generation of stigma, or a perfect division between compensation as opposed to punishment, retribution or communication of values. 73 Indeed, it has already been seen that is now common within the administrative sphere to provide for 'penal' sanctions, enforced by a public agency in an administrative procedure, and that, so long as certain conditions are satisfied, this appears to be compatible with the ECHR. A second problem is that even if, for example, there are valid distinctions which can be drawn, such as the different burden of proof in criminal, as opposed to civil law, or the exclusive ability of the criminal law to imprison, 74 these are purely descriptive and do not explain why criminal and civil law are regarded as different systems or indeed whether they should be. 75 Answers to this more normative question vary.
Lamond, for example, argues that crimes are the sorts of serious wrongs that warrant state punishment of the wrongdoer. 76 Only grave 'wrongs that manifest an unwillingness to be guided by the value violated' thus merit punishment under the criminal law. community -in singling out certain conduct for this treatment', the relationship between the legal and lay concepts of crime is 'symbiotic'. 77 The criminal cartel offence, however, presents an example of the criminal law being expanded beyond a body of law which derives from, and presupposes, some moral delinquency. 78 The public in the UK have not habitually been disapproving of cartels. Rather, they have 'traditionally been tolerant of, if not positively welcoming' 79 of them. Even following the introduction of the cartel offence, it does not appear that public attitudes towards cartels have changed: survey evidence indicates that attitudes have remained weak and that there is not great public support for the offence or a consensus that price fixing is morally wrong.
80
On the other hand, the contrary view is that there is no such essential distinction between civil and criminal law and that it is legitimate to use criminal law in the way the Government has done as simply another form of preference shaping disincentives. This approach 81 asks 'what makes particular combinations of choices more or less appropriate for dealing with particular kinds of offences in a particular society '? 82 From this perspective, civil law and criminal law 'are simply two regions on the law's continuum of deterrent threats' 83 and the decision about whether an activity should constitute a criminal offence will 'be based on a comparison between alternative methods of controlling the activity and is not, in general, intrinsic to the activity'. Instead, the first question is whether an activity should be 'priced' or 'sanctioned'. 85 If sanctions are necessary then the question is how they can be made effective, which is in turn dependent on a number of factors. 86 Following this approach there is a role for criminal law 87 when (i) the balance comes down against the use of civil sanctions (perhaps imposed by administrative agencies) 88 ; or (ii) where it is necessary to impose serious non-monetary sanctions unique to the criminal law, such as imprisonment, which, has low social utility.
89 From this perspective, therefore, except where these serious non-monetary sanctions are involved (see further below), there is no inherent relationship between the sanction and the criminal/civil distinction -rather the relationship is between the sanction and the potential error costs it involves and the procedural protections which are necessary to counteract them: it does not demand the choice of one particular system of law (civil/criminal) over the other.
The problem with this latter view is that it does not explain why it is then that 'every society sufficiently developed to have a formal legal system uses the criminal-civil distinction as an organizing principle'.
90 Thus while it might be possible to start from scratch and allocate the roles of private law, administrative sanctions and criminal sanctions according to this account, it does not explain why criminal law is, in so many places, 91 a wholly separate system. Why, as Robinson puts it, have societies not simply adopted a single system in which adequate deterrent sanctions exist? Any need for greater safeguards in the case of greater penalties could have simply been given within one unitary system, rather than 'wasting' 'the criminal law's special procedural safeguards on the large number of less serious criminal cases in which the sanction is no greater than would be available under civil law. The answer, Robinson suggests, is that criminal liability 'signals moral condemnation of the offender' 92 and 'a distinct 85 See further Cooter, above n 81. Prices are extracted for doing what is permitted, whereas sanctions are detriments imposed for doing what is forbidden. Whether prices or sanctions are chosen is dependent on whether lawmakers can most easily determine the external cost of the relevant activity or the socially optimal level of it.
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For example, a low probability of detection will necessitate an increase in the ultimate sanction in order to retain the necessary degree of deterrence (Bowles, Faure and Garoupa, n 61). The use of punitive damages as a sanction is an option, but may create perverse incentives for the bringing of claims (Coffee, n 67, 231); the use of administrative as opposed to criminal sanctions may mean that the enforcing agency has particular expertise, but conversely can involve coordination costs such as agency capture (Bowles, Faure and Garoupa at 407, citing P Fenn and C Veljanovski, 'A Positive Economic Theory of Regulatory Enforcement' (1988) 98 Economic Journal 1055.
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And of course the greater procedural protection it provides, given that the stakes and thus error costs are higher.
88
As a result of the considerations noted in n 86. ibid, 203-206. The notion of moral condemnation here is of a particular, narrow and serious form; there will often be activities which attract moral stigma which would not be considered worthy of the specific and serious signal of condemnation provided by criminal law. For example, in western legal systems adultery is not a criminal offence and there is no suggestion that it should become so.
criminal justice system is the only way to effectively express condemnation and to gain the practical benefits of doing so… by creating a special criminal label and widely disseminating the notion that this label has a different, condemnatory meaning, the system enhances its ability to communicate a clear condemnatory message. Without a distinct criminal system, it would be more difficult to convey the message that some cases signal condemnation yet others do not.' 93 Thus, he concludes, even 'utilitarians ought to want to maintain and sharpen the criminal-civil distinction because it enhances the system's power to reduce crime efficiently '. 94 This account also explains why imprisonment is exclusively used in the criminal sphere. On the one hand, imprisonment could, in theory, be justified purely on the basis of prophylaxis or deterrence, in which case there would be no reason why it could not be used outside the criminal sphere. 95 However, this is not how imprisonment currently does operate. First, it is not available outside criminal law, and this does not appear to be merely a matter of chance. Second, the factors taken into account in deciding whether or not to impose a criminal sentence and if so how long it should be, do not simply reflect ideas of incapacitation from further offending or deterrence. 96 It appears, therefore, that imprisonment is inherently, as well as practically, unique to criminal law, and that the ability to impose a sentence of imprisonment is part of the criminal law's moral signalling function. The imposition of a sentence of imprisonment does therefore necessitate the use of a distinct criminal law process.
This conclusion on the distinctiveness of criminal law fits well both with Lamond's desire to retain the 'doctrinal purity' of criminal law and with the view of those who regard criminal law simply as part of 'a preference-shaping system of disincentives' As noted above, from the point of view of deterrence there is no inherent connection between any given sanction and a particular system of law (civil/criminal), provided that whichever system of law is used, adequate procedural protections are available to counterbalance the greater error cost and lack of social utility of the sanction in question 96 Thus, for example, Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 142(1) lists 5 purposes of sentencing to which a sentencing court must have regard, which includes punishment as well as deterrence, rehabilitation, public protection and reparation. The Sentencing Guidelines Council's Guideline on Seriousness elaborates on these principles by saying that a sentence must start by considering the seriousness of the offence, which will be the key factor in deciding the length of a custodial sentence. 'The seriousness of an offence is determined by two main parameters': the culpability of the offender and the harm caused or risked by the offence. Culpability is then determined by reference to the offender's mens rea, i.e. intent, recklessness, knowledge or negligence. http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/web_seriousness_guideline.pdf 97 Robinson, n 62. See also D Friedman, n 82 and Bowles, Faure and Garoupa, n 84. 98 See, e.g. Bowles, Faure and Garoupa, n 61, 406-7, although they note that stigma may encourage rather than deterring career criminals. See also Khanna, n 89, 1492 and 1497 onwards and R Epstein, 'The Tort/Crime Distinction: A Generation Later' (1996) 76 Boston University law It also suggests that, when considering whether conduct should be criminalised, there should not be too great deviation from what is regarded, or should be regarded, as being reprehensible and deserving of such stigma; there is a need to be wary of forward-looking reasoning which undermines the backward-looking force of criminal law. This does not mean that the criminal law cannot be used to shape or change society's view of the acceptability of a particular activity. What it does mean, however, is that the criminal law should not be utilised simply as a mechanism for creating deterrence without addressing the issue of moral stigma. 99 If criminal law is to have an educative role, it must make clear what is morally reprehensible about the activity in question. 100 In determining whether to criminalise conduct, it is also important to pay attention both to what has been made criminal but also to what has not (Katz's problem of nonfelonious villainy). 101 The credibility of the criminal law may be undermined if one activity is criminalised while another, apparently equally delinquent activity, is not, unless there is a coherent technique for distinguishing between the two.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UK CRIMINAL CARTEL OFFENCE i. A forward-looking approach to criminal law
It has been seen that at the time the original criminal offence was adopted cartels were not perceived to be morally wrong. Rather, criminalisation was driven by a top-down, forward-looking process. 102 It has also been seen that complications can arise where a backward-looking approach to the criminal law is not adopted. In the context of the criminal cartel offences these difficulties were compounded by the decision to incorporate a dishonesty requirement within the original offence. The challenges Review 1, 19. Indeed even Williams', n 62, technical approach warns that '[w]hen the concept of crime is weakened by being made to take in the vast number of summary offences under statute, the tendency must be for the word with its associations to lose its former emotive effect' Thus confining the definition of crime 'to the more serious offences would have the beneficial result that the legal meaning would correspond more closely with the popular one'114-115. Indeed, although they start from different premises, there is a large degree of convergence between the two approaches. Lamond, although he starts from a more deontological perspective, nevertheless acknowledges that various practical considerations must also play a role in the decision to criminalise certain conduct, n 61, 628. Conversely, community standards are important in ascertaining how much of an activity is optimal from a consequentialist perspective (Coffee,n 67, 227.
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In either of Stanton-Ife's senses of the word, n 92. 100 Normative stigma, in order to generate the necessary psychological moral stigma Stanton-Ife, n 92.
See also Robinson n 62, Epstein, n 98, especially 20-1 and nn 107-108 and text. 102 The difference between the two could in some ways be characterised by the distinction between focusing exclusively on the harm produced and focusing on both the harm and an assessment of the moral culpability of the defendant.
presented by the Ghosh test, 103 which requires a jury to make both a moral assessment of whether the defendant's behaviour is dishonest by the standard of reasonable and honest people and an assessment of whether the defendant realised that he was acting dishonestly by this standard, are great enough in the context of ordinary criminal laws such as theft. 104 It is questionable, however, whether juries would be willing to conclude that a defendant had acted dishonestly in concluding a cartel agreement, in circumstances where the jurors would be unlikely to have pre-existing instincts about the kind of conduct involved and also might be swayed by arguments that, for example, the defendant had not benefited personally and/ or had justifications for how he had behaved (for example, trying to avoid redundancies or business closure). 105 It seems difficult therefore to use dishonesty as a mechanism for signalling the seriousness of an offence and bolstering the view that it should be morally condemned when dishonesty relies upon, and presupposes, a pre-existing sense of moral stigma in order to function: 'it does not seem possible to begin with a forward-looking offence in order to enhance enforcement and, without more, expect it to be successful in sending backward-looking signals of moral censure. The law cannot pull itself up by its own bootstraps in this way, any attempt to do so risks damaging both the process of cartel criminalisation and the criminal law more generally.'
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In its consultation on reform the Government recognised that the dishonesty requirement was likely to be hindering successful prosecution of cartels. In the actual reforms, however, it did not address the questions which seem naturally to follow from such an acceptance: if cartel behaviour is not considered to be dishonest why then should the conduct be criminalised at all? To be successful it seems that, as in other areas of white collar crime where, arguably, 'the public learns what is criminal from what is punished, not vice versa', 107 the new and reformed criminal law must play a role in shaping and changing/educating views of the conduct, explaining why it is that even if the behaviour is not dishonest it should nonetheless be morally condemned and so permitting moral stigma to be generated. Even if therefore the removal of the dishonesty requirement from the UK offence makes convictions more straightforward, this action alone will not guarantee that censure will follow convictions or indeed that judges will be willing to imprison those convicted. 108 Rather, in addition, steps must be taken 'to create, in part through the process of criminalisation itself, a strong sense of the unacceptability of the conduct in question, within the industry in question and beyond ': 109 the process must help build an 103 See n 45. understanding of why cartel conduct warrants official censure, moral condemnation and involves a harm-related moral failing 110 so that that it goes beyond achieving deterrence and punishment. If these steps are not taken, the law will not be able to benefit from the deterrent effect of precisely this moral signalling function which it sought to harness through the criminalisation process. Further, 'conviction may generate little stigma, little by way of deterrence may be achieved, and little by way of punishment may be justified. Consequently, the criminal law is liable to fall into disrepute, in the eyes of both prosecutorial agencies, and those subject to regulation, alike'. 111 The success of a criminal regime is also dependent upon the message about the 'wrong' of cartel behaviour not being undermined by not criminalising equally anticompetitive behaviour -the problem of non-felonious villainy outlined above.
These are important points which, arguably, explain the success of the US criminal regime. 112 In the US, the criminal nature of antitrust law -for corporations and individuals alike -has been a trait since its inception. Not only has the Sherman Act of 1890 always provided that violations of its core antirust provisions are criminal in nature (originally misdemeanours, now felonies) and set out the maximum fines and periods of imprisonment that may follow for those found to be in breach, but the antitrust system as a whole has always benefitted from public support. Indeed, the passage of the Sherman Act 1890 was specifically a reaction to 'populist outrage' about the conduct of the 'trusts' and a recognition that there was a pressing need to do something about them. 113 114 Baker, n 34 and Werden, n 30. 115 Even then it has taken a long time for criminalisation of antitrust conduct to become accepted, see eg, Werden, n 30.
116 Baker, n 34, 27. Shaffer & Nesbitt, n 7 ('Criminalization implicates moral judgments that vary with sociocultural context. U.S. antitrust law has long exhibited a moral dimension, which facilitates the use of criminal sanctions against individuals in cartel cases. In contrast, "there appears to be (at least outside North America) no strong feeling on the part of the wider public about the inherent criminality of price fixing and like practices." National competition authorities
ii. Generating moral stigma and distinguishing other anticompetitive conduct
In order to generate moral stigma, therefore, it would seem to be crucial for it to be identified with sufficient clarity what is morally reprehensible about cartel conduct; and what features of such activity distinguish it from other anticompetitive conduct which is not criminalised.
The new criminal cartel offence contains no mens rea requirement but applies to horizontal price fixing and other cartel activity, 117 unless one of the statutory exclusions (EA02, section 188A) or defences (EA02, section 188B) apply. The former specifies certain circumstances in which the cartel offence is not committed -broadly where (i) 'relevant information', sufficient to establish that the offence might apply, is notified to customers or a person requesting a bid, or is published, or (ii) if the agreement is made to comply with a legal requirement. The latter incorporates defences to the commission of the cartel offence -broadly where the individual can show that he or she (i) did not intend that the nature of the arrangements would be concealed from customers or the CMA or (ii) took reasonable steps to disclose his or her actions to a legal advisor.
It could be argued that because, for example, the new regime 'carves out' agreements which had been notified or published and/or which have not been concealed or hidden from legal advisors, that a connection can be made between the covert and secretive agreements prohibited by the offence and the concept of 'deception', fraud or other offences against which there is a moral norm. 118 If it was the Government's aim in the new legislation to so link the new offence, the connection is at best indirect; the core of the new version of the offence targets price fixing and other cartel arrangements 119 not deception. Deception, or at least a failure to disclose, or false representation is only implied. Further, deception per se is not a criminal offence. Thus section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006 creates an offence (under section 1) where a person makes a false representation, but only if (s)he does so dishonestly and intending to make a gain or cause a loss or risk of loss. 120 In addition, and more fundamentally, however, it is submitted that this approaches the issue from the wrong outside of North America recognize this uphill battle and thus view public education about the evils of cartel offenses as a central component of their missions...').
direction. Criminal law is a last resort and should be used as such. The question therefore should not be whether it is ex post facto possible to justify a criminal offence by finding some, albeit indirect, connection to the core of criminal law. Rather it should be whether it has been sufficiently established that only criminal law can truly address and signal the moral delinquency inherent in cartel conduct -in this case this clearly has not been done.
The Government has also not made it clear why cartels have been singled out and treated differently from other types of anti-competitive agreements and single firm conduct. Although it could be again argued that the Government has sought, through the new exclusions and defences to link the offence with the fact that cartels frequently involve an element of secretive conspiracy (they are covert or involve a 'spiral of delinquency' 121 ), are easy to conceal, are designed to clearly subvert the process of competition with the objective of increasing the members' profits whilst causing significant economic harm to markets and customers which is 'manifest, considerable, and calculable', 122 it is not clear that these factors alone are sufficient justification for criminalising cartel activity but not other seriously anti-competitive conduct. Other conduct prohibited by the antitrust laws may also cause significant economic harm, even if it may not be so great or as easy to quantify and/or the conduct may be harder to conceal.
123 Such conduct may also involve an element of secretive concertation (because the conspirators wish to hide the existence of any serious competition law violation), 124 a calculated defiance of the antitrust laws and/or an element of abuse of individual or collective corporate power -this is the reason why significant corporate fines have been imposed on infringing undertaking(s) for a number of different type of antitrust violations. Indeed the largest fine ever imposed by the Commission on a single undertaking was the €1.06 billion fine levied on Intel 125 -not for participating in a cartel, but for abuse of its dominant position.
The strongest argument for criminalising cartels, but not other conduct targeted by the antitrust laws, seems to rest on the fact that, not only do cartels restrict competition between competitors and cause significant harm, but that they are 'naked': they do not involve cooperation which is reasonably necessary to generate efficiencies or otherwise benefit consumers. 126 The conduct does not, therefore, necessarily seem to require an element of secrecy or deception but is targeted because it constitutes a frontal assault on the principle of competition, is relatively easy to identify and to distinguish from pro-competitive behaviour, 127 is clearly condemned by competition law rules 128 and inflicts great economic harm which should be prohibited rather than taxed.
129 These points are not drawn out in the legislation which, on the contrary, has been deliberately designed not to engage with them (see further section 4.A below). It would seem essential, however, that these aspects of cartel conduct should be clear, if a case for criminalisation is to be built and if an anti-cartel culture is to 'evolve' to the point that it is natural to view cartel activity as a serious crime.
iii. Why are individuals but not corporations criminally liable for cartel conduct?
In the US and Canada the legislator and/or enforcers have sought to draw a clear line between conduct subject to civil and criminal enforcement respectively. Criminal enforcement -against corporations and individuals -is reserved for concealed hardcore cartel activity. Other agreements are reviewed only in civil proceedings. In the UK, however, although the legislature has striven to separate and differentiate the criminal offence from the civil one, no line has been drawn between cartel conduct which is subject to criminal enforcement and conduct which is not. Rather, both criminal and civil enforcement is feasible and, indeed, may be required in hardcore cartel cases -individuals may be prosecuted criminally for their participation in a cartel, but the undertaking, through which the individual acted and which directly benefits from the offence, can only be investigated in an administrative procedure. In Marine Hoses, for example, the undertakings involved were fined following investigation by the Commission, whilst the individuals involved were prosecuted criminally and imprisoned. 130 In the absence of a coherent justification for this difference in treatment, the 'non-felonious villainy' problem arises as the criminal law is allowed to signal moral opprobrium in a random and inconsistent fashion: the signal about the moral culpability of perpetrators becomes confused.
The rationale for treating undertakings and individuals resulted from the Government's desire to maintain consistency with EU law (for the undertakings) whilst at the same time seeking to separate the criminal offence from the civil regime with the objective of ensuring that its enforcement would not be compromised by virtue of it being characterised as 'national competition law' within the meaning of Article 3 Regulation 1/2003. 131 Other justifications for this distinction in treatment might exist, however. For example, it could be argued that it is not intelligible or desirable to criminalise the conduct of corporations, there is no point in doing sosince corporations feel no shame and cannot be imprisoned, and/or that it is the individuals not the legal person that are, in reality, responsible for the violation. Criminalisation of the conduct of corporations can, however, be intelligible and desirable in certain circumstances. Indeed, as corporations are systems with a culture that exists independently of the specific personnel in the company, corporate policy can be regarded as the corporation's 'purpose', 132 containing a synthesis and compromise of the views of the individuals involved. Consequently, in some cases the intentionality which can be said to lie behind the policy may be one more appropriately attributable to the company than to any particular individual or individuals within it. 133 Where this is the case corporations do, arguably, possess the two conditions necessary for blameworthiness; the ability to make decisions and to fail, inexcusably, to perform an assigned task. Indeed, criminal liability may be required to express 'the community's condemnation of the wrongdoer's conduct by emphasising the standards for appropriate behaviour' and 'defeat[ing] the wrongdoer's valuation of the worth of some person or good.' 134 This also suggests that it is not possible to justify a clear allocation of criminal responsibility for a violation between the corporation and individual respectively. Rather, it reinforces the view that cartels have both a collective corporate and a human dimension. Although, therefore, cartel conduct could result from an individual's defiance of corporate policy, and his hiding of the conduct from senior management and general counsel, so too could it result from a corporate culture that condones or encourages such behaviour -whether directly or indirectly. 135 This indicates that even though it may be important that 'management is sufficiently incentivised to take a personal interest in facilitating compliance with the company's legal obligations' 136 and it may be questioned whether corporate sanctions alone can be effective in deterring cartels, 137 the question of who should accept responsibility for the conduct and bear the sanctions is complex and may differ significantly from case to case.
It seems difficult, therefore, to justify a rule which assumes that it is the individual alone who should be held morally culpable for a cartel infringement through criminal proceedings. There should be the possibility at least of treating corporations and 132 See, e.g. E Colvin, 'Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability' (1995) 6 Criminal Law Forum 1. 133 See, e.g. J Gobert, 'Corporate Criminality: four models of fault ' (1994) 139 where the coherence of criminal law is already being stretched by expanding its reach to the conduct of corporations (unnatural subjects of the criminal law), 140 even greater care should be taken to ensure that liability is attached only to conduct considered to be morally stigmatic enough to justify criminalisation.
THE UK REGIME: SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN CRIMINALISATION A. SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS: DEFINING THE OFFENCE
The decision to layer a criminal cartel offence on top of the administrative one has, in addition to the theoretical problems discussed above, created both substantive and procedural difficulties, which may have contributed to both a lack of clarity about the scope of the offence and its under-enforcement.
As the criminal offence does not exactly mirror the civil counterpart it seeks to reflect and supplement, a core difficulty has been to ensure that the offence is not overinclusive. Although designed to apply to only a subset of agreements prohibited by Article 101/Chapter I CA98, the legislature has not found it easy provide a sufficiently clear legal definition of such activity 141 which distinguishes the problematic hardcore cartel conduct targeted from conduct which is not targeted and which would not infringe the civil prohibition. In particular, the criminal offence is not designed to reach benign or pro-competitive horizontal cooperation agreements which might require some restrictions on the competitors' price setting or output, for example: agreements amongst competitors to charge a common price in a blanket licence agreement for artistic works; the fixing of interchange fees in a payment system; syndicated bank loans and/or certain insurance underwriting.
In some jurisdictions, the criminal legislation draws a clear distinction between these different types of conduct. In Canada, for example, although price-fixing, market allocation and output restriction agreements between competitors are illegal per se and can be prosecuted criminally there is a statutory ancillary restraints defence for restraints which are directly related to and reasonably necessary to give effect to a broader or separate agreement among the parties (such agreements are reviewable only under the civil rules). In the UK, the Government has not wished to allow criminal trials to be muddied by allowing this kind of economic and efficiency criteria to be raised by the defendant. Rather, it has sought to ensure that the offence will not prohibit agreements which would be lawful under the civil rules through indirect means. The dishonesty requirement proved to be a poor mechanism for bridging weakness in the objective definition of the prohibited conduct. 142 It also appeared that it was unlikely to achieve the Government's objective of excluding economic evidence from criminal trials. 143 In the debate that led up to the reform of the cartel offence, the Government accepted this.
The Government will hope, therefore, that that the incorporation of exclusions, combined with statutory defences and prosecutorial guidance, will prove a better mechanism for doing so. As, however, the legislation has again approached the problem 'indirectly', and this time in an extremely formalistic manner, it is not clear that it will fare better. On the contrary, the language utilised in the new legislation, which is not familiar to competition lawyers, is already causing considerable turbulence in the business community and fear that the criminal offence applies too broadly, encompassing a number of benign ventures between competitors. Prosecutorial Guidance setting out when prosecution is (or is not) likely to be in the public interest, is unlikely to be of much immediate comfort to business-people concerned that they may have committed a criminal offence and about the wider consequences that follow from a criminal offence having been committed (for example, money laundering issues, the nullity of the agreement and the possibility of extradition), not to mention rule of law concerns with such an approach. 144 Even if, therefore, the new offence is certain enough to survive the relatively un-exacting requirements of Article 7 145 it seems possible that the offence will have the effect of 144 See the CMA's Consultation on Prosecution Guidance for the cartel offence, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243709/5-carteloffence-prosecution-guidance-consultation.pdf. Some jurisdictions, such as the US, have however also defined criminal antitrust offences broadly and relied on judicial interpretation and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to confine, over time, its application to established, secretive hard-core cartel offences. In the US it has, over a long period of time, become clear that price fixing which is ancillary to an efficiency enhancing integration is not illegal per se under section 1 nd officials at the DOJ Antitrust Department have sought to clarify that they will only criminally prosecute agreements with no possible legitimate business or economic justification and which have been concluded in secret with pre-emptive cover-ups -scenarios in which defendants cannot reasonably argue that they did not grasp the illegality of their conduct. See speech T Barnett, Seven Steps to Better Cartel Enforcement, 2 June 2006. The development of defined circumstances in which criminal prosecutions will be brought has been critical to the efficient administration of justice in the US. deterring the conclusion of some pro-competitive arrangements and undermining the Government's objective of putting in place a competition regime for growth.
B. PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES
It has been seen that the co-existence of two separate civil and criminal cartel regimes requires one process for proceeding against legal entities and another for proceedings against individuals. 146 Further, that as no coherent moral justification has been provided for this difference in treatment there is a danger that the message about the criminality of the individual's behaviour is being undermined. Another problem is that the set-up is cumbersome procedurally. It requires the exercise of different enforcement models (one judicial and one administrative) for the different proceedings, the use of different enforcement powers 147 and the exercise of extreme care to ensure that one process is not compromised by the other. In some circumstances, the criminal and administrative processes may even be handled by two different agencies, as was the case in Marine Hoses for example. 148 As criminal investigations and proceedings are also more resource intensive than administrative ones and significantly more risky, enforcers may be encouraged to side-step all of these complications by side-lining the criminal offence 149 and bringing administrative proceedings instead. In 2009, for example, the OFT did not bring criminal proceedings but imposed major fines on construction firms engaged in bid-rigging with competitors 150 and recruitment agencies 151 engaged in price fixing, stating that both cases involved serious and significant violations. These decisions 'highlight the dangers of loss of credibility and compromise of deterrent impact where an enforcement agency describes a cartel case as serious yet gives no explanation, or an unconvincing explanation, for not bringing criminal proceedings'. 
CONCLUSIONS
The UK's criminal cartel offence has not, to date, been a success and the Government has accepted that it has not had the deterrent effect desired. On the contrary, the events which have unfolded appear to confirm that dangers are inherent in the use the criminal law to prohibit conduct to which no pre-existing moral stigma is attached. Criminalisation in such circumstances risks undermining its ability to provide an 146 effective deterrent and the moral signalling function of the criminal law more generally. It remains to be seen whether the 2013 reforms will be sufficient to overcome the problems with the offence identified. It does not appear, however, that the Government has yet taken sufficient steps to develop an anti-cartel culture and/or to identify the specific features of cartel activity that might be used to build a consensus that moral condemnation, and criminalisation, of cartel conduct is warranted. In addition, the continuing existence of an overlapping administrative offence is liable to further weaken the force of the criminal law both by undermining the message about criminality that the Government is trying to create and by incentivising the CMA to sidestep more complex and risky criminal proceedings. Conversely, while it may not deter cartel activity, uncertainty about the scope of the new offence might chill beneficial cooperation between competitors, by leading to undesirable risk-aversion and to the over-commitment of firm resources in the avoidance of risk.
The difficulties that have been encountered in the UK should provide salutary lessons for other countries considering how best to combat and to deter cartels. Indeed, given the significant obstacles to criminalising cartel activity identified, serious consideration should be given to the question of whether, alternatively, civil liability might be expanded to provide a more efficient and effective mechanism for increasing deterrence. 153 First, concerns about sanction insufficiency could be addressed. For example, if corporate fines are believed to be insufficient to ensure deterrence, the category of actors liable under civil rules could be expanded, perhaps to encompass individuals directly involved 154 (although absolute personal liability must certainly be un-indemnifiable and un-shiftable, 155 this does not mean that it must be criminal in nature 156 ) or other actors such as lawyers, underwriters, outside directors or accountants who possess privileged information about the company and have the capacity to influence firm behaviour to ensure compliance with the law (gatekeeper liability 157 ). Further a broader array of civil sanctions could be considered, including individual fines or non-monetary sanctions such as disqualification orders and/or punitive injunctions for corporations. 158 Second, the issue of enforcement insufficiency could be addressed. 159 Indeed, Becker's research on major felonies in the US suggests that the probability of detection had a greater impact on the commission of (major felony) offences than the level of punishment. 160 Steps could therefore be taken to encourage greater public enforcement, private enforcement (particularly stand-alone actions, Landes and Davis, for example, conclude following a study of forty successful private antitrust cases, that more than half the underlying violations were first uncovered by private attorneys rather than government enforcers 161 and that private litigation 'probably does more to deter antitrust violations than all the fines and incarceration imposed as a result of criminal enforcement by the DOJ' 162 ) and to increase the probability of detection. Although leniency regimes are now routinely operated by antitrust enforcers, a broader range of actors could be drawn in. In the context of corporate fraud, for example, Dyck, Morse and Zingales demonstrate that actors with no residual claim in the firms involved, such as employees, non-financial-market regulators and the media, 163 can play a key role in fraud detection. Not only do such people gather considerable relevant information as a by-product of their normal work, they also have broad range of incentives for uncovering fraud. Such incentives include journalistic reputation, avoidance of potential legal liability, and, crucially, monetary reward, see for example the Federal Civil False Claims Act, also known as the qui tam statute.
164 Similar provisions are also used for the detection of tax evasion, 165 and can be used in the antitrust context. 166 In conclusion, it seems that there are significant difficulties and obstacles involved in introducing an effective criminal cartel offence. For jurisdictions considering how best to increase the deterrent effect of their anti-cartel rules it might, therefore, be sensible to consider a full range of possible options, including whether liability should be individual and/or corporate, criminal and/or civil before it is concluded that individual criminal liability is the solution. 
